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 In this paper we disentangle the impact of household financial constraints on 
mortgage rate from a number of dimensions of credit risk. This analysis relies on a dataset 
that contains information on the economic and financial decisions of Spanish households 
in four different years: 2002, 2005, 2008, and 2011. Our results suggest that banks’ 
profitable customers are able to bargain for lower mortgage rates. However, contrary to 
other studies, the risk profile does not have a significant effect on mortgage rates. Credit 
institutions tend to charge higher rates during the crisis to all customers, irrespective of 
their risk profiles.  
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We analyze credit institutions’ mortgage rate lending policy to households, disentangling 
the impact of financial constraints from that of the borrower’s risk profile. In particular, 
we study how the mortgage rates charged to households depend on their credit risk, the 
constraints they face, and their characteristics as profitable bank customers. This analysis 
relies on a dataset that contains information on the economic and financial decisions of 
Spanish households in four different survey waves conducted in 2002, 2005, 2008 and 
2011. Having information on such years facilitates a better understanding of the business 
cycle and the recent financial crisis in the aforementioned analyses. 
The focus on the conditions of household credit relies on the high relevance of 
this type of credit for both banks and households. Thus, Beck et al. (2012) document that 
over the period 1994 - 2005 household credit amounted to 80% of bank credit in Canada, 
76% in the United States (U.S.), 66% in Australia, 60% in France and 56% in the United 
Kingdom. Mortgages are also the most important financial liabilities of households, 
accounting for 75% of household debt in the U.S. (Bucks et al. 2009) and 83% in the 
Eurozone (European Central Bank 2013). 
There is extensive literature analyzing the effect that the financial constraints 
households face when looking for external funding has on the homeownership rate. The 
general result is that both income and wealth constraints affect the homeownership rate 
(see Linneman and Wachter 1989; Duca and Rosenthal 1994a; Linneman et al. 1997; 
Haurin et al. 1996, 1997; Rosenthal 2002; Barakova et al. 2003; Calem et al. 2010; among 
others for evidence based on U.S. households, or Bourassa and Hoesli 2010 for evidence 
based on Swiss households). Wealth constraints have been found to dominate income 
constraints in the U.S. (Barakova et al. 2014), Europe (Ampudia and Mayordomo 2015), 
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and Italy (Diaz-Serrano 2005). Thus, credit constraints should affect borrowing rates as 
they affect the decision to buy/rent a home.  Contrary to previous papers, our interest does 
not rely on the effect of financial constraints on access to housing but on the cost of that 
funding. 
The effect of financial constraints on mortgage rates has been indirectly studied 
through household risk or credit scoring. Based on U.S. data, Einav et al. (2013) show 
that one of the advantages of the better risk classification of credit scoring is the ability 
of lending institutions to target more generous loans at lower-risk borrowers. Edelberg 
(2006) shows that lenders used risk-based pricing of interest rates in consumer loan 
markets in the U.S. during the mid-1990s. Along the same line, Magri and Pico (2011) 
analyze the mortgage pricing of Italian households between 2000 and 2007 to show that 
lenders have increasingly priced mortgage interest rates on household credit risk. Chiang 
et al. (2002) employ data from Hong Kong to document that households with the worst 
credit scoring are charged a higher mortgage rate spread. Tsai et al.’s (2009) model 
reaches a similar conclusion as default risk increases the mortgage yield. On the contrary, 
Duca and Rosenthal (1994b) provide little support for the hypothesis that U.S. lenders 
vary mortgage rates across loan applicants on the basis of observable differences in credit 
risk. Thus, lenders may respond to the borrower risk by varying non-rate terms such as 
the down-payment or payment-to-income constraints. 
There is no consensus on the relationship between credit scoring and mortgage 
rates. In addition, the effect of financial constraints on mortgage rates has not been studied 
directly, but indirectly through household risk or credit scoring. Our paper aims to provide 
additional evidence to this discussion, analyzing the effect that household credit scoring 
or credit risk and financial constraints have on mortgage rates Moreover, our paper also 
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contributes to the literature by analyzing the evolution of lending standards in the context 
of the recent crisis.  
Beyond the household risk profiles and the conditions for access to funding, not 
much is known about the effect of other dimensions that could be of interest to banks’ 
business lines, such as the future profitability of customers. The analysis of the effect of 
financial characteristics of banks’ customers is related to the financial intermediation 
literature, which documents that relationship banking mitigates information asymmetries 
between lenders and borrowers. In line with this ‘information view’ of relationship 
banking, extensive empirical literature explores the prevalence and economic relevance 
of firm-bank relationships in corporate lending. Recent studies also show the role of 
relationship banking in consumer credit in the U.S. (Holmes et al. 2007, Agarwal et al. 
2010) and Germany (Puri et al. 2011) and mortgages in U.S. (Keys et al. 2010) and 
Switzerland (Brown and Hoffmann 2013).  Keys et al. (2010) were the first to show 
evidence on the role of information asymmetries between lenders and borrowers in 
mortgage lending during the recent financial crisis. Brown and Hoffmann (2013) 
contribute to this strand of literature by providing empirical evidence on the scope, 
geographic proximity and duration of mortgage relationships, and by examining whether 
the heterogeneity of mortgage relationships across households can be rationalized by 
information asymmetries between lenders and borrowers. Finally, Allen et al. (2014) use 
transaction-level data on Canadian mortgage contracts to document the existence of price 
discrimination by banks that is explained by consumer bargaining leverage.  
 We share some of the objectives pursued by previous papers as several of the 
household dimensions used to characterize them as profitable customers for the bank can 
also be used to define household-bank relationship. Nevertheless, our paper analyzes in 
detail the former theory and presents an exhaustive study that divides the customer 
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profitability dimension into two categories depending on the banking business to which 
they refer: asset management or fee-oriented activities.  
By way of a preview, the main findings of the paper are as follows: those 
households who may become profitable customers are able to bargain for lower mortgage 
rates. Nevertheless, household credit risk is not a driver of mortgage rates as credit 
institutions charge similar rates irrespective of the household risk profile before and 
during the crisis. In fact, credit institutions tend to charge higher rates during the crisis to 
all customers irrespective of their risk profiles or their degree of profitability. This result 
suggests that instead of household idiosyncratic risk, borrowing rates could be affected 
by a factor reflecting aggregate level of risk common to all households.  In addition the 
level of households’ credit risk could be an important driver of the bank’s decision on 
whether or not to grant the mortgage. In this sense, in Spain it has been common for banks 
to advertise a mortgage rate that it is supposed to reflect the aggregate level of risk and 
represents the maximum level of a spread over a market index. This adjustable rate can 
be modified downwards if customers meet a number of requirements, including having 
other services already provided by the same bank (e.g. insurance, savings accounts or 
direct debits). Hence, the credit scoring of banks in Spain frequently evaluates whether 
customers are eligible for such a mortgage contract at the advertised rate, only 
subsequently, if the customers qualifies for a lower rate because they satisfy certain cross-
selling conditions and have an appropriate level of wealth. During upturns, and in 
particular during a housing bubble, bank competition pushes some of these adjustable 
rates excessively downwards and banks incur an excessive long-term risk as the rates do 
not reflect the over-the-cycle risk profile of borrowers but rather their current wealth 
status and the scope (number of services) of their relationship with the bank.  
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 The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data, hypotheses and 
methodology. Section 3 contains the results and Section 4 some robustness tests. Section 
5 concludes. 
2. Data, hypotheses and methodology  
2.1. Data sources 
The data employed for this study originate from the Spanish Survey of Household 
Finances (Encuesta Financiera de las Familias, EFF hereafter), managed by the Bank of 
Spain. This survey gathered data about the financial and economic situation of Spanish 
households in 2002, 2005, 2008, and 2011. The survey also includes detailed information 
on their assets, liabilities, sources of income, use of financial services, demographic 
characteristics and housing. The EFF offers certain retrospective information on housing, 
such as the year and price of acquisition, and the amount and conditions relating to the 
mortgage at both the origination and the survey date, if the mortgage is still in existence. 
The information in this survey will also enable us to obtain information on the financial 
status of households (wealth and income constraints). Additionally, as mentioned above, 
it is possible to obtain information on the mortgage at the survey date and when the 
housing was purchased. The data availability (from 2002 to 2011) facilitates the analysis 
of the research hypotheses -defined in the next section- under both pre-crisis and crisis 
periods. 
 Among the determinants of mortgage rates considered in our analysis are the 
financial constraints faced by households on lending conditions. In order to deal with the 
effect of these constraints we need to implement a two-fold analysis so that we first 
predict the coefficients for the desired home value to construct credit constraints.  Then, 
we evaluate the lending conditions based on household characteristics such as the 
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financial constraints they face, their risk, and their nature as potential profitable customers 
for banks. 
The subsamples originating from the original data for the analysis devoted to 
estimating the desired housing value is defined following the method of Ampudia and 
Mayordomo (2015) in their study of the role of financial constraints on homeownership. 
The subsample selects the homeowners in which the person of reference is between 25 
and 60 years old in the year of the survey. We exclude those households who received 
the home free of charge or in the form of a bequest. Some of the households in the EFF 
appear in several waves and some of them appear just once. We select those households 
who have been living in their current primary residence for 3 years or less, so that the 
retrospective imputation of income, wealth, and other demographic characteristics is 
more reliable. The use of recent homeowners implies that both the purchase value and the 
value on the survey date, as declared by the household, are a proper approximation for 
the real purchase price and the real current price, respectively. Due to discrepancies in the 
survey years and the year in which the households purchased the home, we use 
retrospective imputation methods to use the information accordingly. For instance, to 
know the income we use the inflation rate to adjust the current income; as regards the 
wealth, we consider consumption, income, and debt payments. 
The sample used to analyze the determinants of the mortgage rates is defined from 
the same households used to obtain their desired housing value who are living in an owned 
property and who financed their house purchase through a loan.  
The EFF makes imputations to correct answers of the type “do not know, do not 
answer” and offers five imputed values. The multiple interaction allows us to reflect the 
uncertainty associated with the imputation process (see Rubin (1987)) and is relevant to 
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estimating the parameters of a regression and to constructing the descriptive statistics, 
especially those related to the income and wealth dispersion.1  
2.2. Research Hypotheses 
Before the recent financial crisis, credit supply was high and it diminished substantially 
during the crisis. Nevertheless, little is known about the dimensions that the banks 
considered when setting the price of such mortgages. Customers identified as profitable 
for the bank exhibit a higher bargaining power to negotiate interest rates. Among the 
dimensions that define profitable customers are the use of credit cards, electronic 
payments, checks, direct billing or direct deposits, telephone banking and Internet 
banking.2 
Hypothesis 1: Households offering potential profit opportunities to the bank 
benefit from mortgages with lower interest rates. 
However, there could be other household characteristics that would increase the 
interest rate charged to the mortgage. Among these characteristics we highlight the ones 
related to the household’s risk profile: credit scoring, previous indebtedness and financial 
constraints. 
                                                          
1 In addition, households have different likelihoods of being selected for the survey, given the 
overrepresentation of the wealthiest households and the geographic stratification. For this reason, the survey 
contains weights for each household that are necessary in order to obtain descriptive statistics for the 
population. Nevertheless, following Rosenthal (2002), to estimate the models proposed in this study we 
assign the same weights to each observation of the corresponding subsample. 
2 The customer profitability measures in our study cannot directly capture the extent to which those profits 
come from cross-selling opportunities. However, we hypothesize that this cross-selling to customers 
represents potential profitable opportunities for the bank. In fact, it is very common in Spain for the bank 
granting the mortgage to typically offer interest rate discounts (or other benefits associated with the 
mortgage) to their already existing or new customers if these clients already hold or purchase other (fee-




Hypothesis 2: Financial institutions charge higher rates to those households being 
financially constrained, with poor credit scoring, and with a portfolio of debt prior to 
purchasing the house. 
Credit institutions could have changed their lending standards during the recent 
crisis. For this reason, we check the validity of the aforementioned hypotheses during the 
crisis period. During the crisis, there could be price dispersion such that higher interest 
rates could have been charged to constrained and indebted households or, on the contrary, 
banks could charge higher mortgage rates without considering households’ 
characteristics. 
Hypothesis 3: Credit institutions tend to charge higher rates during the crisis to 
all customers irrespective of their risk profiles or their degree of profitability. 
2.3. Methodology 
The methodology consists of two stages. In the first, we estimate the desired home value 
to define the financial constraints faced by households; this variable will be employed 
jointly with other potential drivers of lending conditions to understand the banks’ lending 
practices. 
2.3.1. Estimation of desired home value 
The estimation of a desired home value could be problematic as the distance between the 
survey and the purchase dates expands. For this reason, we employ a subsample of 
households consisting of those buying their home during the period spanning the three 
years prior to the survey date (for each of the four EFF surveys). For this purpose we use 
the home purchase price to define the desired home value for those households that are 
not constrained. To implement this analysis, the explanatory variables need to be 
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specified for the same year in which the housing was purchased, given that the desired 
housing value is determined from the housing purchase price. However, the values for 
the explanatory variables in the survey correspond to the year when the household was 
interviewed rather than the year when the housing was purchased. Consequently, we 
apply discount factors to express the explanatory variables in terms of the year of the 
purchase.  This methodology is explained in detail in the Appendix. 
We first define the wealth and income constraints faced by the EFF households at 
the home purchase date from the desired home and purchase limit values compatible with 
the household not being constrained in wealth and income. For the case of wealth, we 





                           (1) 
where 𝑁𝑊𝑖 is the household net wealth at the home purchase year and 0.8 is the maximum 
loan-to-value compatible with banks' standard provisions. This constraint requires 
refraining from lending the whole value of the house to avoid moral hazard problems and 
ensure incentive compatibility. 
We next define the purchase limit value compatible with the household not being 





                     (2) 
where 𝑌𝑖 denotes the total annual household income at the home purchase year and r is 
the interest rate that is applied to the loans for the home purchase.3 This constraint requires 
                                                          




the mortgage payments to be less than 33% of household income (the loan payment is 
interest only). This constraint ensures that the household is able to pay the mortgage and 
avoid potential high delinquency ratios. In the access-to-mortgage guide elaborated by 
the Central Bank of Spain,4 one of the variables that is explicitly considered to determine 
the amount of the loan is household income. This guide explicitly recognizes that an 
important aspect is the borrower’s payment capacity, given that both lender and borrower 
should try to ensure that their monthly mortgage payment does not exceed a given 
percentage of their monthly net income. This is to guarantee that once the mortgage 
payment is made, the household has a level of income high enough to afford the standard 
expenditure. Among the mortgage recommendations given to banks and households is 
the limit that the mortgage payment should represent over the household net income. In 
particular, the monthly mortgage payment should not exceed 30-35% of households’ 
monthly income.5 
In the event that the desired home value of household i on the date at which it 
purchased its current home, 𝑉𝑖
∗, is greater than 𝑉𝑖
𝑊, the household is constrained in wealth. 
Equivalently, the household is constrained in income if 𝑉𝑖
∗ is greater than 𝑉𝑖
𝑌. 
To implement the corresponding estimation, a household is considered as 
constrained, irrespective of whether it is constrained in income or wealth, if the logarithm 
of the desired home value is greater than the logarithm of the minimum of the two limit 
values, 𝑉𝑖
𝑊 and  𝑉𝑖








                                                          
4 See “Guía de Acceso al Préstamo Hipotecario” (Bank of Spain): 
http://www.bde.es/bde/es/secciones/informes/Folletos/guia_de_acceso_a/ 
5 See the webpage on financial education developed by the Central Bank of Spain and the Securities and 








∗    𝑖𝑓 𝑙𝑛𝑉𝑖
∗ < 𝑙𝑛𝑍𝑖  
𝑙𝑛𝑍𝑖    𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒     
              (3) 
where all the variables are observable with the exception of Vi
∗ in case lnVi
∗ ≥ lnZi. When 
lnVi
∗ < 𝑙𝑛Zi the desired housing value Vi
∗ is the home purchase price for the house in 
which household i lives. It is postulated that lnVi
∗ will be given by: 
𝑙𝑛𝑉𝑖
∗ = 𝛽′𝑋𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖                 (4) 
where ui iid~N(0, σ
2) and 𝑋𝑖 is a vector containing the household characteristics at the 
year in which the households purchased the house: the logarithm of annual income, the 
logarithm of gross wealth, age of the person of reference and its square. Moreover, Xi 
contains other current characteristics of the household that are assumed to be invariant 
between the date the home is purchased and the survey date (marital status, gender, labor 
situation, education, whether the household lives in an urban or rural area, number of 
household members, and the number of those members that are employed), and the year 
the home was purchased, to control by the specific characteristics of each year. β is the 
vector of coefficients accompanying the variables in vector Xi. The specification given 
by equations (3) and (4) corresponds to a generalized Tobit model (given that the point 
of censure Zi varies across individuals) that will be estimated by maximum likelihood. 
2.3.2 The role of households’ risk profiles and characteristics on mortgage rates 
The desired home value at the year of the survey, ?̂?𝑖
∗, is obtained from the estimated 
coefficients in the previous stage. This imputation is done for each of the households in 
the sample using the value of the variables for the year in which they moved to their 
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current home. The sample consists of households who are living in an owned house and 
financed their purchase of the house through a loan. We denote the new limit values 




To have a continuous indicator to measure the strength of financial constraints, 
we use as a proxy for financial constraints the ratio of the desired home value relative to 
each of the limit values of the two constraints. Thus, we measure the degree of constraint 










, respectively. In the event that either of the two 
previous ratios are greater than 1, that household will be constrained and the higher the 
ratio, the stronger the degree of constraint. 
Besides financial constraints, we use a credit risk indicator as an additional 
dimension of household risk profile. As shown in the Appendix, the credit scoring is also 
based on income and wealth information. In order to disentangle the effect of both 
financial constraints and the indicator of credit risk we orthogonalize the two credit 
constraint variables by regressing them on the credit risk indicators and using the residuals 
to proxy for the income and wealth constraints. After defining the constraints, we estimate 
the effect of a series of variables affecting bank lending policies through the interest rates 
charged to the mortgages. For that aim, we regress the mortgage interest rate in excess of 
1-year Euribor for household i (𝑟𝑖) on a vector of variables 𝑋𝑖 affecting the mortgage rate: 
𝑟𝑖 = 𝛿′𝑍𝑖 + 𝑖              (5) 
where the vector 𝑍𝑖 includes a measure of the household risk scoring; a variable indicating 
whether the household is profitable for the bank in view of its use of banking resources; 
the orthogonalized wealth and income constraints; a dummy variable indicating whether 
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the household has other types of debt besides the mortgage; and the age and labor situation 
of the person of reference. Furthermore, we use dummy variables indicating the year the 
home was purchased in order to control by the specific characteristics of each year. 
3. Results 
3.1 Estimating the desired home value 
Panel A of Table 1 contains the descriptive statistics of several variables employed to 
estimate the desired housing value.6 The sample is built from homeowners and consists 
of a total of 864 households. The appendix includes the definition of all the variables of 
interest employed in the estimation of the desired home value. 
< Insert Table 1 here > 
The coefficients concerning the effect of the variables on the home purchase price, 
according to the Tobit model, for estimating the desired home value are reported in Table 
2. The sample consists of 864 households who purchased their homes between 1999 and 
2011. Of those households, 175 are censored. 
We observe that both the annual income and the gross wealth before the home 
purchase exhibit a positive and significant effect on the desired home value. In regard to 
household demographic characteristics such as age, gender, number of people living in 
the home, or marital status, we do not observe any significant contribution to the desired 
home value after controlling by means of the other characteristics employed in this 
analysis. On the other hand, the well-educated tend to prefer more expensive houses than 
those households that only completed primary education. We observe that the higher the 
number of employed people living in the home, the lower the desired home value. This 
                                                          
6 The standard deviations of dummy variables are not reported as they are meaningless.  
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effect could be explained by the fact that lower income/wealth tends to increase the 
number of household members working, to achieve a minimum level of income/wealth. 
As regards the labor situation, the dummy variable that is employed as a reference in 
order to interpret the coefficients refers to households that are employed (not self-
employed). We then observe that the only employment category leading to significant 
differences in terms of the desired home value is the one relating to retired households. 
The desired home value of retired households is much lower than the value observed for 
households in which the person of reference is employed. We observe that the desired 
value for houses in urban areas is substantially higher than in rural areas. These 
coefficients will be used to impute the household’s desired home value in the next part of 
the analysis. 
< Insert Table 2 here > 
3.2 The role of households’ risk profiles and characteristics on mortgage rates 
The sample employed to study the determinants of mortgage rates consists of 636 
households and the descriptive statistics for the variables employed in the corresponding 
analysis are contained in Panel B of Table 1. We observe that the average spread over 1-
year Euribor for those households with a mortgage is 134 basis points. Average customer 
profitability is 2.99, indicating that, on average, households use/hold three types of the 
services/assets offered by the bank. The vast majority of these services are fee-oriented. 
Regarding the degree of income constraints, we observe that the desired home value in 
terms of income and wealth limits is lower than one, indicating that the average household 
is neither income nor wealth constrained. However, the average household tends to be 
more frequently wealth than income constrained. Finally, we observe that 38% of 
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households have other types of debt rather than the mortgage employed to purchase the 
home.  
Table 3 contains the results for the estimation of equation (5). The total number 
of homeowners with mortgage in this analysis consists of 636 households. The interest 
rates are mainly determined by macro/global conditions due to the high significance of 
the year dummy variables. Besides these macro effects, we observe that the main channel 
to bargaining on interest rates is being a potentially profitable customer for the bank (in 
line with Hypothesis 1). The results point towards a negligible effect of variables relating 
to household risk profile on the interest rate that is later charged to the household, which 
does not support Hypothesis 2. Nevertheless, we observe that unemployed households 
pay higher mortgage rates. 
< Insert Table 3 here > 
The high level of competition in the Spanish mortgage market could explain why 
mortgage rates do not differ across borrowers. A number of studies such as van 
Leuvensteijn et al. (2011) or Crespi et al. (2004) show evidence of this intense 
competition in Spain, both for commercial and saving banks. The deregulation and 
liberalization of the banking sector in Spain in the early 1990s helped to explain this 
phenomenon. During the first years of our sample period, the saving banks extended their 
branches out of their original regions. This led to a significant increase in the number of 
branches per capita. In fact, according to The World Bank Data, Spain was the second 
country with the highest number of commercial bank branches per 100,000 adults in 2008 
and 2011 after San Marino. There were 88.54 branches per 100,000 adults in 2011 and 
104.01 in 2008. This is a very high number compared to the European Union (34 and 33 
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branches on average in 2008 and 2011, respectively) in which a high percentage of 
residential mortgages are originated by banks. 
The effect of this high competition could particularly affect the mortgage market. 
Lago-González and Salas-Fumás (2005) document that mortgages have shown a low 
degree of differentiation in Spain. Similarly, Maudos et al. (2002) indicate that there was 
downward pressure on interest margins in Spain in the 1990s due to competition, inter 
alia, in mortgage markets. Therefore, the borrower risk could be incorporated in the bank 
decision to grant loans given that the high level of competition impedes banks from 
adapting mortgage interest rates to borrower risk. 
Being a profitable customer for financial institutions includes several dimensions 
that could be dealt with in detail. Thus, banks may consider such customers to be 
profitable because they have a wide battery of financial assets that can be managed by the 
banking group, such as mutual funds, pension funds or insurance. In addition, households 
may be of interest to banks due to the use of other services offered by the bank, such as 
credit cards, checks, direct billing, telephone and internet banking, or electronic payments 
that represent income for financial institutions. Thus, we split the customer profitability 
variable into two categories according to the banking business to which they refer: asset 
management or fee-oriented activities. Column 2 of Table 3 shows the results obtained 
when the two customer profitability related variables are jointly introduced in the 
regression.  We observe that although both types of activities exhibit a negative 
coefficient, only those customers who are of interest to the bank due to fee-oriented 
activities benefit from significantly lower mortgage rates. In fact the coefficient 
associated to fee-oriented activities is statistically significantly higher than the one related 
to asset management activities. For an additional comparison of the coefficients, we 
analyze the effect of each explanatory variable on the dependent variable given a change 
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of one standard deviation on the former variables. Thus, when the variable showing fee-
oriented activities increases by one standard deviation (0.98), the mortgage rate charged 
decreases by 14.4 b.p. Nevertheless, when the variable reflecting to asset management 
activities increases by one standard deviation (0.65), the mortgage rate charged only 
decreases by 3.2 b.p.  
Finally, due to the characteristics of our data, which include a pre-crisis and a 
crisis period, we analyze the differential effects of the previous variables reflecting 
different banking practices during the crisis period. For this purpose, we repeat the 
previous analysis and include a series of additional explanatory variables in both stages. 
These additional variables consist of a dummy variable for the crisis period that takes on 
a value of 1 after 2009 (the year after the Lehman Brothers’ collapse at the end of 2008) 
and the interaction of this dummy variable with the four variables relating to household 
risk profile (orthogonalized income and wealth constraints, risk scoring, and use of other 
types of debt) and with the variables relating to customer profitability. Results are 
reported in Table 4. 
We obtain a non-significant effect for the wealth constraint and the credit risk 
indicator that provides suggestive evidence of a strong monitoring of wealth constraints 
and risk with regard to access to funding, rather than charging higher rates to those 
constrained households. In fact, the only crisis related variable that exhibits a significant 
effect is the crisis dummy variable. This result is in line with a result supporting the 
limited role of household credit risk on the mortgage rate and suggests that banks treated 
borrowers equally in terms of the interest rate charged during the crisis period as it was 
increased for all the households consistent with Hypothesis 3. The average borrowing 
spread increased by 1.26% during the crisis period, ceteris paribus. Nevertheless, there 
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was an exception since those customers that could offer profitable opportunities for the 
bank obtained funding at a lower rate. 
Although the risk of the clients does not exhibit a significant effect on the 
borrowing rate, it is very relevant for the bank decision of whether or not to grant the 
mortgage. Moreover, the lack of significance of household idiosyncratic risk could be 
explained by the role played by the aggregate level of risk that is common to all 
households and that leads to a strong increase of borrowing rates during the crisis period. 
< Insert Table 4 here > 
4. Robustness tests 
4.1 Alternative specifications of income and wealth constraints  
The maximum loan-to-value (LTV) ratio in our analysis is set at 0.8. Nevertheless, in the 
pre-crisis period mortgages had LTV ratios higher than 0.8, which are consistent with 
higher debt capacity and less financial constraints on households. Along the same lines, 
the threshold of 33% imposed on mortgage payments relative to income could also be a 
different percentage for some households. In the interest of confirming the robustness of 
our results with regard to alternative thresholds for the definition of the financial 
constraints, we check the robustness of our results when we use an LTV equal to 0.7 and 
0.9 and mortgage payment to income thresholds equal to 0.25 and 0.4.7 Results are 
reported in Table 5. 
Column 1 contains the results of the baseline analysis reported in the interest of 
comparability. Columns (2) and (3) contain the results obtained for an alternative 
                                                          
7 Note that the use of LTV equal to or greater than 100% implies that the wealth constraint cannot be used 
in our analysis. 
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definition of the financial constraints for which we use a loan-to-value equal to 0.7 and 
0.9, respectively. Although the magnitude of the constraint coefficients changes slightly, 
both income constraints remain non-significant. The effects of the remaining variables 
remain invariant with respect to those obtained in the baseline specification. Columns (4) 
and (5) report the results obtained for an alternative definition of the income constraint, 
for which we use thresholds 0.25 and 0.4, respectively, as the mortgage payment to 
income. The results obtained for the two alternative income constraint specifications are 
very similar those ones observed in Column (1), confirming the limited effect of income 
constraint on the mortgage rates.  
< Insert Table 5 here > 
4.2 Dealing with the endogeneity of income and wealth 
In this subsection we deal with the potential endogeneity of income and wealth. 
Permanent income could be more important than current income to explain the tenure 
choice and housing consumption as both decisions are taken in the long term. For this 
reason -and to avoid any potential source of endogeneity- we use an exogenous proxy for 
permanent income. As shown by Haurin et al. (1997), the use of permanent income may 
overcome potential problems of endogeneity given that it is a predicted value and not an 
observed one. Haurin et al. (1997) derive the permanent income by estimating predicted 
values based on a regression of the income on exogenous explanatory variables such as 
age, education, gender, race/ethnicity, and health. The endogeneity of the income is also 
suggested by Bourassa (2000) who also uses permanent income to calculate the 
borrowing constraint gap for New Zealander households. Bourassa (2000) excludes the 
age and marital status from the set of variables to predict permanent income and, instead, 
uses education and location related variables. The exclusion of age and marital status is 
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due to the fact that they could introduce or exacerbate problems of collinearity in the 
tenure choice equation. 
In our attempt to predict permanent income for each wave in the survey to deal 
with the potential endogeneity of household income, we regress the income on several 
characteristics related to the head of family, such as gender, health, and educational levels, 
and dummy variables indicating the sector in which she/he works (primary, secondary, 
or tertiary) We also control by the number of people dwelling in the house. Results on the 
drivers of the mortgage spread obtained using permanent income instead of income are 
reported in Column (1) of Table 6. The results obtained are consistent with the ones 
obtained in the baseline regressions and suggest that our results are not affected by the 
potential endogeneity of income. 
In addition, and to show that our results are not affected by the potential 
endogeneity of wealth, we use the predicted wealth to estimate the desired housing value 
and to calculate borrowing constraints. In particular, we follow Duca and Rosenthal 
(1993, 1994a) and Bourassa (2000) and regress net wealth on all of the exogenous 
variables in the model as well as some additional variables. We regress net wealth on the 
exogenous variables employed in the previous analyses: education, gender, dummy 
indicating whether the household lives in an urban or rural area, number of household 
members, and the number of those members that are employed. We also use the following 
additional variables that are not defined in the Appendix: (i) a dummy that equals one if 
the household has art or antiques, and zero otherwise; (ii) number of years that the head 
of the family has been working at their current employer; (iii) a dummy that equals one 
if the household has used a mortgage loan to finance services or goods other than real 
estate, and zero otherwise; (iv) a dummy that equals one if the household has had 
problems making loan payments in the last year, and zero otherwise; (v) a dummy that 
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equals one if the household has a checking account, and zero otherwise; and (vi) a dummy 
that equals one if the household has received an inheritance, and zero otherwise. 
Column (2) of Table 6 reports the results obtained when we deal with the potential 
endogeneity of both income and wealth. The results are fully consistent with the baseline 
analysis and suggest that the potential endogeneity of either income or wealth does not 
affect our results. 
< Insert Table 6 here > 
4.3 Dealing with selection bias 
For this purpose, we use a Heckman (1979) two-step econometric technique to control  
using the sample selection bias originated in the decision on whether or not to finance the 
home purchase using a loan. This methodology consists of two steps. The first step is 
devoted to modelling the likelihood of financing the home purchase through a loan, 
whereas the second stage determines the drivers of the loan characteristics by correcting 
selection bias given the estimates from the first stage. 
The Heckman selection model assumes an underlying regression relationship: 
𝑟𝑖 = 𝛿′𝑋𝑖 + 1𝑖             (6) 
where 𝑟𝑖 denotes the mortgage interest rate in excess of 1-year Euribor, and 𝑋𝑖is a vector 
of variables affecting the mortgage rate, including a measure of the household risk 
scoring; a variable indicating whether the household is profitable for the bank in view of 
its use of banking resources; the orthogonalized wealth and income constraints; a dummy 
variable indicating whether the household has other types of debt besides the mortgage; 
and the age and labor situation of the person of reference. Furthermore, we use dummy 
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variables indicating the year the home was purchased in order to control using the specific 
characteristics of each year. 
Nevertheless the dependent variable for household i is only observed if the 
household has a mortgage. This is determined from a selection equation such that 𝑟𝑖 is 
observed if: 
𝛾𝑍𝑖 + 2𝑖 > 0             (7) 
where  1𝑖~𝑁(0, 𝜎), 2𝑖~𝑁(0,1), 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟( 1𝑖, 2𝑖) = 𝜌 . Moreover, 𝑍𝑖𝑗 includes the 
same variables in 𝑋𝑖 plus the number of members employed and living in the home as an 
additional measure that could determine whether the household uses a mortgage to 
finance the housing purchase. 
 The total number of households employed in this analysis consists of 1,409 
households, of which 722 are censored (coinciding with those households that are renters 
and those that did not use a loan to purchase their home). However, the estimated 
coefficient for the inverse Mills ratio (the lambdas) is not significantly different from 
zero, confirming that there is no sample selection bias due solely to the use of 
homeowners with mortgage in the baseline analysis. Thus, there is no selection bias 
originated in the decision on whether or not to finance the home purchase using a loan 
and so even controlling for it the results remain unchanged. 
5. Conclusions 
Previous literature shows that riskier borrowers pay higher interest rates. However, it is 
inconclusive with regard to the impact that different factors related to household risk may 
have on the mortgage rate. Moreover, the effect of household risk profiles on mortgage 
rates has traditionally been measured by means of credit scoring or risk indicators, 
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meaning that important dimensions of the constraints (home affordability) are not subject 
to control. Our paper adds evidence to this discussion by analyzing the effect that credit 
risk, income and wealth constraints, previous debts, and certain characteristics that may 
help credit institutions to identify clients as profitable customers have on mortgage rates.  
Our data comes from the Spanish Household Finance Survey in four different 
years: 2002, 2005, 2008, and 2011. The Spanish case is a particularly interesting one as 
the country experienced a large housing bubble in the years prior to the crisis that burst 
during the last period of our sample. In this sense, our methodology and data allow us to 
identify the impact of financing constraints and credit scoring on the mortgage lending 
policy before and during the crisis.  
Our results suggest that “profitable customers” -in terms of the future fees that the 
credit institutions may charge them- are able to bargain for lower mortgage rates. 
Nevertheless, household risk profiles do not affect the mortgage rates they are charged. 
In fact, credit institutions tend to charge higher rates during the crisis to all customers 
irrespective of their risk profiles or their degree of profitability.  Overall, the results 
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Appendix. Definition of variables 
The control variables used in our analysis are created as follows: 
a. Household income 
The EFF provides the household income in the year of survey. To obtain the desired home 
value we need the household income for the year in which the home was purchased. We 
obtain the income for that year by discounting the income by the inflation. This is 
equivalent to assuming that the income increases at the same rate as inflation does. 
b. Household net and gross wealth 
The household gross wealth is obtained as the sum of the value of financial assets (listed 
and non-listed stocks, mutual funds, pension funds, life insurance, bank time deposits and 
other financial assets) and real assets (principal residence, other real estate properties, 
jewelry, art, and own business, in the event that they run a business) held by the 
household.  The net wealth is defined as the total wealth minus the household’s total debt. 
To obtain the desired home value we use the net wealth in the year in which the household 
purchased the home. This is calculated as the gross wealth minus the change in the 
housing value and the total savings over the period spanning from the home purchase date 
to the survey date. 
c. Other household characteristics 




- Education: three dummy variables indicating whether the highest level of 
education of the person of reference is obtained at primary school, high school, or 
university. 
- Age of the person of reference and age-squared. 
- Number of family members. 
- Number of adults working. 
- Rural/urban area: dummy variables constructed on the basis of the economic 
sector in which the activities of the person of reference take place: primary, 
secondary, or tertiary sector, under the assumption that those households in which 
the person of reference works in the primary (secondary or tertiary) sector live in 
a rural (urban) area. 
- Gender: dummy variables for the gender of the person of reference. 
- Year of move: dummy variables indicating the year in which the household 
purchased/rented their current home. 
- Marital status: four dummy variables indicating whether the person of reference 
is single, married or in a consensual union with legal basis, widowed, or divorced. 
- Labor situation: four dummy variables indicating whether the person of reference 
is employed, self-employed, retired, or unemployed. 
All the previous variables are employed to obtain the desired housing value, where the 
variables are defined in terms of the year in which the household purchased the home. 
We impute the value of the variables at the purchase year as follows.  The education, 
number of family members, number of working adults, rural or urban area proxy, gender, 
marital status and labor situation are assumed to remain unchanged between the year in 
which the home is purchased and the survey date. This imputation method seems 
reasonable given that the maximum distance between the two events is 3 years.  Given 
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that the survey contains the year of birth of the person of reference, we can easily calculate 
his/her age at the year of purchase. 
d. Credit Scoring 
The survey does not contain information on the credit scoring. We propose a simple 
measure of this scoring following the advice of financial institutions on the dimensions 
and practices considered to define this scoring and the set of variables proposed in the   
access-to-mortgage guide elaborated by the Central Bank of Spain to define the credit 
history.8 This measure of scoring is adapted to the variables contained in the EFF. Our 
aim is to create a credit scoring indicator on the basis of the main information used by 
banks to evaluate the process of mortgage granting. The scoring is a weighted average of 
three dimensions that refer to the household capacity for payment (with the weights 
shown in brackets): (i) payment and capital capacity (50%), (ii) household characteristics 
and payment history (30%), and (iii) characteristics of other household debts (20%). Each 
category consists of several subcategories with different weights and scores as follows: 
- Payment and capital capacity (50%): 
o Ratio of liquid assets to income: LI (50%) 
 If LI > 0.75 then scoring = 25. 
 If LI > 0.5 and LI ≤ 0.75 then scoring = 18.75. 
 If LI > 0.25 and LI ≤ 0.5 then scoring = 12.5. 
 If LI ≤ 0.25 then scoring = 6.25. 
o Ratio of total debt relative to labor income: DL (30%) 
 If DL < 2 then scoring = 15. 
                                                          




 If DL ≥ 2 and DL < 4 then scoring = 11.25. 
 If DL ≥ 4 and DL < 6 then scoring = 7.5. 
 If DL ≥ 6 then scoring = 3.75. 
o Ratio of total debt relative to total gross wealth: DW (20%) 
 If DW ≤ 0.25 then scoring = 10. 
 If DW > 0.25 and DW ≤ 0.5 then scoring = 7.5. 
 If DW > 0.5 and DW ≤ 0.75 then scoring = 5. 
 If DW > 0.75 then scoring = 2.5. 
- Household characteristics (30%): 
o The person of reference in the household is married or in a domestic 
partnership (15%) 
 If yes then scoring = 4.5, otherwise scoring = 0. 
o The household has other real assets that could be used as guarantee (15%) 
 If yes then scoring = 4.5, otherwise scoring = 0. 
o There is a civil servant among the household members (35%) 
 If yes then scoring = 10.5, otherwise scoring = 0. 
o At least two people living in the household are employed (35%) 
 If yes then scoring = 10.5, otherwise scoring = 0. 
- Characteristics of other household debts (20%): 
o Time-to-maturity of the mortgage: TM (70%) 
 If TM > 20 then scoring = 14. 
 If TM ≥ 10 and TM < 20 then scoring = 10.5. 
 If TM ≥ 5 and TM < 10 then scoring = 5.25. 
 If TM < 5 then scoring = 1.3124. 
34 
 
o The household uses several loans for the house purchase (30%) 
 If yes then scoring = 6, otherwise scoring = 0. 
The scoring indicator is defined such that the higher the scoring obtained, the greater the 
risk. The measure is between 0 (lowest risk) and 100 (highest risk). 
e. Customer profitability 
We consider two categories depending on the banking business to which they refer in 
order to define profitable customers: fee-oriented activities or asset management 
activities. Fee-oriented activities are: (i) the use of credit cards, (ii) use of electronic 
payments, (iii) use of checks, (iv) use of direct billing or direct deposits, and (v) use of 
telephone and internet banking. Asset management activities include: (a) holdings of 
mutual funds, (b) holdings of life insurance, and (c) holdings of pension funds. For each 
of the eight total categories referring to the use of a given service or the holding of a given 
asset, we define a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 in cases where the household 
uses the corresponding service or holds the corresponding asset, and a value of 0 
otherwise. To define the variable referred to total profitability, we total the values 
obtained for the 8 dummy categories so that a household that uses all services and holds 
all three types of assets will be assigned a value of 8, whereas the minimum value that 
can be obtained is zero. We later distinguish the degree of profitability in relation to fee-
oriented activities by totaling the values of the five dummy variables (i) to (v), so that the 
resulting variable value ranges between 0 and 5. Finally, in order to obtain the degree of 
profitability in relation to asset management activities, we total the values of the three 





Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Panel A of Table 1 contains the descriptive statistics (mean, median, and standard deviation) of a 
series of variables referred to the housing, the financial situation and several demographic 
characteristics of households that purchased homes close to the four survey dates employed in 
our analysis (2002, 2005, 2008, and 2011). These are used to estimate the desired home value of 
the households. Panel B contains the descriptive statistics of the variables employed to study the 
determinants of mortgage spreads (degree of financial constraints, customer profitability, risk 
profile, and demographic characteristics) based on a sample that consists of recent home buyers 
that used a mortgage to finance the house purchase. 
Panel A 
Variables Mean Median SD 
Housing price of purchase 201,056 137,893 232,343 
Annual income before housing purchase 50,571 31,376 63,227 
Gross wealth before housing purchase 453,364 73,951 1,702,729 
Age 39.26 38.00 9.50 
Marital status: Single 0.19 0.00 . 
Marital status: Married or consensual union 0.71 1.00 . 
Marital status: Widowed 0.02 0.00 . 
Marital status: Divorced 0.09 0.00 . 
Education: Primary 0.32 0.00 . 
Education: Secondary 0.34 0.00 . 
Education: Tertiary 0.34 0.00 . 
Number of people dwelling in the home 2.85 3.00 1.27 
Number of people with job dwelling in the home 1.57 2.00 0.68 
Gender ( 1 = Male 0 = Female) 0.62 1.00 . 
Labor situation: Employee 0.66 1.00 . 
Labor situation: Self-employed 0.16 0.00 . 
Labor situation: Unemployed 0.02 0.00 . 
Labor situation: Retired 0.19 0.00 . 
Housing is in a urban area (1 = Yes 0 = No) 0.89 1.00 . 
% Households buying housing 1999 11.61 0.00 . 
% Households buying housing 2000 7.52 0.00 . 
% Households buying housing 2001 4.28 0.00 . 
% Households buying housing 2002 12.52 0.00 . 
% Households buying housing 2003 10.76 0.00 . 
% Households buying housing 2004 6.76 0.00 . 
% Households buying housing 2005 13.93 0.00 . 
% Households buying housing 2006 8.70 0.00 . 
% Households buying housing 2007 6.06 0.00 .. 
% Households buying housing 2008 6.85 0.00 . 
% Households buying housing 2009 5.09 0.00 . 
% Households buying housing 2010 4.28 0.00 . 
% Households buying housing 2011 1.64 0.00 . 





Variables Mean Median SD 
Mortgage rate spread (over 1-year Euribor) 1.18 1.06 1.24 
Degree of income constraint 0.38 0.32 0.26 
Degree of wealth constraint 0.79 0.24 4.39 
Customer profitability (all activities) 2.99 3.00 1.35 
Customer profitability (fee oriented activities) 2.52 2.00 0.97 
Customer profitability (asset management activities) 0.47 0.00 0.65 
Risk scoring 39.74 39.00 15.33 
Debt other than mortgage (Yes=1) 0.38 0.00  . 
Age 38.90 38.00 8.52 
Number of people dwelling in the home 2.96 3.00 1.25 
Labor situation: Employee 0.69 1.00  . 
Labor situation: Self-employed 0.17 0.00  . 
Labor situation: Unemployed 0.01 0.00  . 
Labor situation: Retired 0.16 0.00  . 
% Households moving at 1999 12.19 0.00  . 
% Households moving at 2000 5.81 0.00  . 
% Households moving at 2001 4.08 0.00  . 
% Households moving at 2002 13.21 0.00  . 
% Households moving at 2003 11.99 0.00  . 
% Households moving at 2004 7.05 0.00  . 
% Households moving at 2005 19.30 0.00  . 
% Households moving at 2006 8.84 0.00  . 
% Households moving at 2007 5.39 0.00  . 
% Households moving at 2008 3.38 0.00  . 
% Households moving at 2009 4.31 0.00  . 
% Households moving at 2010 3.19 0.00  . 
% Households moving at 2011 1.28 0.00  . 











Table 2: Estimation of desired housing value 
This table contains the coefficients obtained from the estimation of desired housing value using a 
sample that consists of recent buyers over the period spanning the three years prior to the survey 
date, as explained in Section 2.1. The results are obtained on the basis of a censored model that 
uses the logarithm of the purchase price as the desired home value for those households that are 
not constrained in income or wealth, and the minimum of the logarithm of home value compatible 
with not being constrained for those constrained households as the dependent variable. Besides 
the variables referred to the housing and household financial and demographic characteristics, we 
use year of purchase fixed effects and the estimation is robust to heteroskedasticity. Standard 
errors are reported between brackets. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively. 
Dependent variable: Housing purchase price  Coefficient 
Annual income before housing purchase 0.368*** 
  (0.04) 
Gross wealth before housing purchase 0.010* 
  (0.01) 
Age 0.008 
  (0.03) 
Squared of age 0.000 
  (0.00) 
Marital status: Married or consensual union 0.103 
  (0.09) 
Marital status: Widowed 0.155 
  (0.21) 
Marital status: Divorced 0.010 
  (0.12) 
Education: Secondary 0.272*** 
  (0.07) 
Education: Tertiary 0.404*** 
  (0.08) 
Number of people dwelling in the home 0.032 
  (0.03) 
Number of people with job dwelling in the home  -0.132** 
  (0.05) 
Gender ( 1 = Male 0 = Female) -0.036 
  (0.06) 
Labor situation: Self-employed 0.102 
  (0.08) 
Labor situation: Retired  -0.624*** 
  (0.22) 
Labor situation: Unemployed or Non-active 0.026 
  (0.08) 
Housing is in a urban area (1 = Yes 0 = No) 0.311*** 
  (0.10) 
Year Fixed-Effects Yes 
Number of Observations 864 






Table 3: The role of households’ risk profiles and characteristics on mortgage rates 
This table contains the results that aim to understand the effect of a series of variables affecting 
mortgage rates. To this end, we regress the mortgage interest rate in excess of 1-year Euribor 
(mortgage spread) on a series of explanatory variables. These variables include those affecting 
the mortgage rate, including a measure of household risk scoring; a variable indicating whether 
the household is profitable for the bank in view of its use of banking resources; wealth and income 
constraints; a dummy variable indicating whether the household has other types of debt besides 
the mortgage; and the age and labor situation of the person of reference. We furthermore use 
dummy variables indicating the year the home was purchased in order to control using the specific 
characteristics of each year. Column (1) refers to the case in which the variable indicating whether 
the household is profitable for the bank, in view of its use of banking resources, is defined 
considering both fee-oriented and asset management activities. The results contained in column 
(2) correspond to the case in which the variable indicating household profitability is defined using 
fee-oriented activities and asset management activities. Standard errors are reported between 
brackets. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Dependent variable: Mortgage spread (1) (2) 
Client profitability  -0.113***   
  (0.04)   
Client profitability (fee-oriented)    -0.147*** 
    (0.05) 
Client profitability (asset management)   -0.049 
    (0.04) 
Risk scoring 0.000 0.001 
  (0.00) (0.00) 
Degree of income constraint -0.245 -0.251 
  (0.18) (0.18) 
Degree of wealth constraint 0.005 0.0048 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Debt other than mortgage (Yes=1) 0.084 0.086 
  (0.06) (0.06) 
Age 0.006 0.005 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Labor situation: Self-employed 0.051 0.053 
  (0.08) (0.08) 
Labor situation: Retired 1.104 1.118 
  (0.69) (0.68) 
Labor situation: Unemployed or Non-active 0.370*** 0.369*** 
  (0.15) (0.15) 
Year Fixed-Effects Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 636 636 







Table 4: The role of households’ risk profiles and characteristics on mortgage 
rates. The effect of the crisis 
This table contains results aimed at providing an understanding of the effect of a series of variables 
affecting mortgage rates. To this end, we regress the mortgage interest rate in excess of 1-year 
Euribor (mortgage spread) demeaned each year, depending on the year in which the housing was 
purchased, on a series of explanatory variables. These variables include those affecting the 
mortgage rate, including a measure of household risk scoring; a variable indicating whether the 
household is profitable for the bank in view of its use of banking resources; wealth and income 
constraints; a dummy variable indicating whether the household has other types of debt besides 
the mortgage; a crisis dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 from 2009; and the interaction 
of the crisis dummy variable with the five aforementioned variables. We furthermore use the age 
and labor situation of the person of reference. Standard errors are reported between brackets. ***, 
**, and * denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Dependent variable: Demeaned mortgage spread Coefficient Std. Error 
Customer profitability  -0.104*** (0.03) 
Risk scoring 0.002 (0.00) 
Degree of income constraint -0.194 (0.15) 
Degree of wealth constraint 0.005 (0.01) 
Debt other than mortgage (Yes=1) 0.077 (0.10) 
Customer profitability x Crisis -0.138 (0.11) 
Risk scoring x Crisis -0.046 (0.04) 
Degree of income constraint x Crisis 0.058 (0.38) 
Degree of wealth constraint x Crisis -0.144 (0.17) 
Other debt besides the mortgage (Yes=1) x Crisis -0.029 (0.29) 
Crisis 1.258* (0.67) 
Age 0.006 (0.01) 
Labor situation: Self-employed 0.056 (0.11) 
Labor situation: Retired 1.063 (1.12) 
Labor situation: Unemployed or Inactive 0.362*** (0.14) 
Constant -0.082 (0.30) 
Number of Observations 636   










Table 5: The role of households’ risk profiles and characteristics on mortgage 
rates. Alternative financial constraints 
This table contains results aimed at providing an understanding of the effect of a series of variables 
affecting mortgage rates using alternative definitions of financial constraints. To this end, we 
regress the mortgage interest rate in excess of 1-year Euribor (mortgage spread) on a series of 
explanatory variables. These variables include those affecting the mortgage rate, including a 
measure of household risk scoring; a variable indicating whether the household is profitable for 
the bank in view of its use of banking resources; wealth and income constraint; and a dummy 
variable indicating whether the household has other types of debt besides the mortgage. We 
furthermore use the age and labor situation of the person of reference and dummy variables 
indicating the year the home was purchased in order to control using the specific characteristics 
of each year. Column (1) contains the results of the baseline analysis that are reported in the 
interest of comparability. Columns (2) and (3) contain the results obtained for an alternative 
definition of the financial constraints for which we use a loan-to-value equal to 0.7 and 0.9, 
respectively. Columns (4) and (5) report the results obtained for an alternative definition of the 
income constraint for which we use as the mortgage payment to income thresholds 0.25 and 0.4, 
respectively. Standard errors are reported between brackets. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Dependent variable: Mortgage spread  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Client profitability  -0.113***  -0.114***  -0.113***  -0.114***  -0.113*** 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Risk scoring 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Degree of income constraint -0.245 -0.295 -0.207 -0.166 -0.310 
  (0.18) (0.21) (0.15) (0.11) (0.23) 
Degree of wealth constraint 0.005 0.003 0.0098 0.004 0.0048 
  (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Debt other than mortgage (Yes=1) 0.084 0.084 0.085 0.083 0.085 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Age 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.006 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Labor situation: Self-employed 0.051 0.049 0.053 0.055 0.051 
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Labor situation: Retired 1.104 1.101 1.104 1.102 1.102 
  (0.69) (0.69) (0.69) (0.69) (0.69) 
Labor situation: Unemployed or Non-active 0.370*** 0.371*** 0.368*** 0.366*** 0.371*** 
  (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
Year Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 636 636 636 636 636 






Table 6: The role of households’ risk profiles and characteristics on mortgage 
rates. Use of permanent income and predicted wealth 
This table contains results aimed at providing an understanding of the effect of a series of variables 
affecting mortgage rates. The novelty in Column (1) of Table 6 with respect to the baseline 
analysis in column (1) of Table 3 is that instead of using household income to obtain the desired 
housing value and to define the income constraint, we use the permanent income. Permanent 
income is predicted based on regressing the income on exogenous explanatory variables such as 
age, education, gender, race/ethnicity, and health. Results in Column (2) of this table are obtained 
using permanent income and predicted net wealth instead of household income and net wealth to 
obtain the desired housing value and to define income and wealth constraints. As permanent 
income, predicted net wealth is obtained regressing net wealth on a series of exogenous variables. 
Standard errors are reported between brackets. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Dependent variable: Mortgage spread   (1) (2) 
Client profitability  -0.110***  -0.097** 
  (0.04) (0.05) 
Risk scoring 0.001 0.000 
  (0.00) (0.00) 
Degree of income constraint -0.359 -0.031 
  (0.55) (0.03) 
Degree of wealth constraint 0.004 0.001 
  (0.01) (0.00) 
Debt other than mortgage (Yes=1) 0.094 0.077 
  (0.06) (0.06) 
Age 0.007 0.007 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Labor situation: Self-employed 0.079 0.030 
  (0.09) (0.10) 
Labor situation: Retired 1.101 1.073 
  (0.70) (0.68) 
Labor situation: Unemployed or Non-active 0.352*** 0.335** 
  (0.14) (0.15) 
Year Fixed-Effects Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 636 636 
R-squared 0.278 0.278 
 
 
 
 
